

# ARGONAUTA



The Newsletter of The Canadian Nautical Research Society / Société canadienne  
pour la recherche nautique

Volume XL Number 2 Spring 2023

# ARGONAUTA

Founded 1984 by Kenneth MacKenzie ISSN No. 2291-5427

**Editor:** Erika Behrlich

**Argonauta Editorial Office**

Email submissions to: [CNRS-Argo@cnrs-scrn.org](mailto:CNRS-Argo@cnrs-scrn.org)

ARGONAUTA is published four times a year Winter, Spring, Summer, and Autumn

Chair of the Editorial Board:	Roger Sarty
Editor <i>The Northern Mariner/ Le marin du nord</i> :	Peter Kikkert
Webmaster:	Paul Adamthwaite

## **Executive Officers**

President:	Michael Moir
1st Vice President:	Tom Malcomson
2nd Vice President:	Isabel Campbell
Treasurer:	Errolyn Humphreys
Associate Treasurer:	Ian Yeates
Secretary:	Richard Goette
Membership Secretary:	Sam McLean
Councillor/Communications:	Kip Scoville
Councillor:	Ambjörn Adomeit
Councillor:	Walter Lewis
Councillor:	Jeff Noakes
Councillor:	Christopher Perry
Councillor:	Margaret Schotte
Councillor:	Meaghan Walker
Past President:	Richard Gimblett

## **Membership Business:**

PO Box 34029 Ottawa, Ontario, K2S 5B1 Canada email: [sam.mclean@cnrs-scrn.org](mailto:sam.mclean@cnrs-scrn.org)

Annual Membership includes four issues of ARGONAUTA  
and four issues of *THE NORTHERN MARINER/LE MARIN DU NORD*.

Our website: [www.cnrs-scrn.org](http://www.cnrs-scrn.org)



## **In this issue of *Argonauta***

Editorial	1
President's Corner	2
Ten years of <i>The Northern Mariner</i> : A decade of dedicated nautical research and the challenge ahead	3
The Potsdam Conference and the remaining U-boats	11
Shaped by the sea: The maritime world as transformative for work, culture, ideas, networks	28
Draft minutes of the Council meeting	29
<i>Argonauta</i> guidelines for authors	35
CNRS registration and membership form	37



## Editorial

by Erika Behrisch

---

Hi everyone,

This Spring issue is late. So was Spring in many parts of Canada, and as we forgive the winter for hanging on when we see the green shoots and blue robin eggs returning, I hope you forgive me as you peruse the following pages.

This issue is also a manifesto. It begins with a call to arms and a path to the future and ends with a record of our current state. In between are the pieces we rely on in the CNRS: an article crafted through painstaking research to tell an important maritime story and the proof that new ideas in the field are continually being generated. Let me translate all this. Harry Holman's article, "Ten years of *The Northern Mariner*," responds to a recent article in *TNM* by turning the critical lens on our own journal: what have we published lately and how do we contribute to the renewal of the field? It's a powerful article to begin with, and it's the right one to lead the charge. I find that immediately after is the ideal place for Derek Waller's piece on the Potsdam Conference negotiations—yes, it's military history, but it's also representative of the quality of research currently showcased by our Society—and concentrates not on warships themselves, but on the political intrigue around their disposal. Not one person sets foot on a ship; it's maritime history crafted over desks and through memos. Reading Derek's article through Harry's reminds me that, as Harry says, much maritime research maintains "relevance in several fields." This is, I think we can all agree, one of its particular strengths. Following Derek's piece is a teaser for the CNRS conference in August: the list of accepted papers that we'll have the pleasure of hearing in St John's. The list of subjects suggests that our group may see the military and mercantile as worthy launching points for broader explorations of our maritime world. Finally, the Council minutes bring us home, giving us the administrative bookend to Harry's call to action. It's where we are and how we work, pulling together and staying afloat.

Read not as four separate pieces but as one cohesive document, this issue becomes an expression of our mission: to remember where we came from, understand where we are, and be brave enough to chart the future we want.

WMP,

Erika



## President's corner

by Michael Moir

[CNRSPresident@cnrs-scrn.org](mailto:CNRSPresident@cnrs-scrn.org)

This issue brings the return of Council minutes to the pages of *Argonauta*. While the narrative may not grip the reader's attention, they play an important role in keeping members apprised of the well-being of our Society and offer insights into the state of maritime history in Canada. While several months have transpired since last summer's discussions, many of these topics remain current as we head into next summer.

The Society remains in a healthy financial position as we look ahead to publishing between four and seven issues of *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord* in 2023. Publishing the journal is a challenging process of navigating the availability of volunteer editors, authors, peer reviewers, and book reviewers while managing the ebb and flow of submissions that defy prediction and planning, hence the range in the number of issues that may appear this year. The budget also includes provisions for the return to an in-person conference, such as offering the Gerry Panting Award once again to encourage student participation. Meaghan Walker has done excellent work organizing the conference at Memorial University in St. John's with tours and receptions that should draw members to Newfoundland in August. Meanwhile, Thomas Malcomson, our incoming President, has begun work on the 2024 conference in St. Catharines, which will be held in partnership with the North American Society for Oceanic History.

While there is positive news to report, maintaining membership numbers remains a challenge. A strong base is essential for continued publication of the journal as well as encouraging the study of maritime history through conferences and awards. Individual and institutional members have slowly slipped away in recent years as stalwarts die, budgets are cut, and Canadians become less aware of the importance of maritime activities to their lives. It has been particularly difficult to maintain student members. Most join for a couple of years and then move on to other disciplines that offer better chances of graduate studies and potential employment. Council has supported enticements such as the James Pritchard Student Article Prize and free registration for students at this year's conference, but strength in numbers remains elusive. This situation led to a review of membership categories and rates led by Ian Yeates, our Associate Treasurer. His recommendations will be discussed by Council in the coming months with motions to be moved at the annual meeting on 18 August 2023, which will likely include a slight increase in the rates for digital and international members to go along with the change to the amount paid by Canadian members receiving a print copy of the journal that was proposed from the floor at last year's meeting.

In the long term, however, the key to reviving the membership and invigorating the discipline probably lies in creating an endowed chair in maritime history at a Canadian university. This topic also remains on Council's radar, but we have not yet found answers to a couple of important questions. Should this program reside on the east coast, the west coast, or at an inland university on the Great Lakes? What comes first: the university or the donor? I look forward to continuing this discussion with the membership at the annual meeting in St. John's.

## Ten years of *The Northern Mariner*: A decade of dedicated nautical research and the challenge ahead

by H.T. Holman



### Introduction

When I read Dr. Mike Bender's critical article on trends in nautical research in a recent number of the *Northern Mariner*, it struck me that he was writing not just about journals he had selected for analysis but about the field in general. His paper once again raised the question of the current state and the prospects for the future of nautical history.<sup>1</sup> Seeing the numbers that Dr. Bender produced and the inferences that could be drawn from them inspired me to look more closely at how we in the CNRS would fare from similar scrutiny.

Dr. Bender has provided an analysis of ten years of articles appearing in four journals: *The Mariner's Mirror*, *Maritime South West*, the *International Journal of Maritime History* and the *Journal for Maritime Research*.<sup>2</sup> He examines the articles from a number of perspectives and categorizes them according to authorship, content, identity, and periodization. Based on this, he provides several observations, few of which—unfortunately—will come as a surprise to those working or interested in the field. Surprises, if any, come from the intensity of the quantification supporting the anecdotal observations which many of us have likely already made.

After looking at 744 papers, Dr. Bender noted that 88.1% dealt with either war and naval matters (43.3%) or mercantile subjects (44.8%). However, if one excludes the papers in his own journal, *Maritime South West*, the situation is even more extreme, with 95.7% of the articles being either classified as war/naval (50.8%) or mercantile (44.9%). There is some justification in looking at only three of the four journals; there seems to be major differences between *Maritime South West* and the others. It is the only journal not peer reviewed and, while other journals note the high level of rejection of substandard submissions, Dr. Bender (writing as editor of *Maritime South West*) notes that "In fact the editor invariably agrees to publish, but then may request changes and/or offer to help with a re-write." This results in a "more permeable boundary between the researcher and publication."<sup>3</sup>

The results of the study are clear cut. For Dr. Bender:

*Maritime history journals may claim to be interested in all aspects of humankind's relationship to the sea, but, in actuality, only papers on navy and mercantile marines are published, with a flavouring of other approaches. ... Alternative representations barely feature even though study of many other ways in which people have related to the sea could so easily show how vast and fascinating the subject area is.*

He decries the lack of articles on fishing, on recreational usage of the sea, on the relationship between manufacturers and shipping, on coastal transport, on the

participation of marginalized groups, on the relationship between the sea and the arts, on climate change, and by implication many other possible areas of study relating to history and the sea.

This damning indictment of the journals named raises the question of how our own journal, *The Northern Mariner*, might compare when examined in the same light.

### **The Journal**

*The Northern Mariner* was founded by the Canadian Nautical Research Society (CNRS) as a peer-reviewed journal in 1991. The society itself has clearly defined objectives: to promote nautical research in Canada, to disseminate the results of such research, and to encourage an awareness of Canada's maritime heritage. The journal is unusual in that since 2006 it also serves as the publication of another organization with similar but not identical goals: The North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH). The objectives of this Society are to promote the dissemination of information among individuals within North America who are interested in the history of the sea and inland waterways, foster a more general awareness of historical matters pertaining to the sea and its relationship to North America, to disseminate articles, notes, and documents concerning the history of the sea and inland waterways by means of various publications which shall also serve as a means of communication among members of the Society, and to work in cooperation with local, state, regional, and national North American organizations interested in the history of the sea and inland waterways.

In one case the focus is promoting awareness of Canadian research and the maritime heritage of Canada, in the other a major consideration is awareness of the sea and its relationship to North America more broadly. The differences are less important than the similarities. Unlike most of the organizations and journals Dr. Bender examined, the combined scope has a geographic limitation in that the area of focus relates almost exclusively to North America and its surrounding waters. *The Northern Mariner* reflects the overlapping areas of interest of the two organizations and is “devoted to the study of maritime affairs and the inland waterways of the nations that touch the seas of the northern hemisphere.” The editorial span is much less constrained: “The journal’s content spans the fields of naval, political, diplomatic, social, cultural, gender, Indigenous, economic, and environmental history.” In fact, it may be easier to suggest that it encompasses the full spectrum of historical research.

A previous overview of the history of the CNRS and of the content of *The Northern Mariner* appeared in 2016 and the dominance of war and naval articles in the early days of the journal is evident from that discussion.<sup>4</sup> To what extent has that emphasis continued during the recent period?

### **The Approach**

While exactly replicating Dr. Bender’s ten-year study posed several problems, I followed the same general approach. I examined all articles appearing in the online editions<sup>5</sup> of *The Northern Mariner* between 2011 and 2020 with the exception of one special issue in

Vol. 24 no. 3-4 (2014), which was dedicated to the history of the Royal Canadian Navy and whose inclusion would have skewed the results. As well, Bender's analysis of the journals also included notes, reports, and documents but excluded book reviews<sup>6</sup> and queries. Generally, these shorter notes or studies, rather than appearing in *TNM*, are the subject of newsletters such as *Argonauta* and websites of the organizations involved, and I have therefore not included them in the approach taken here. This gave a total of 93 articles.<sup>7</sup> With this much smaller database, statistical analysis is considerably less precise. In addition, some of the considerations that Bender applied (Eurocentrism, British authorship, pre-1500 subject period) were clearly not applicable in *The Northern Mariner* case.

One area that Bender considered was authorship, and here an issue emerged when considering *TNM*. For much of the period, *TNM* appears to have provided no identifying information about the article authors in its online content. It is only when the index pages began including notes from the editor in 2017 that this is remedied to a limited extent.<sup>8</sup> While one might argue that the identity of the author is not essential for judging the value of an article, it is useful in assessing their prior experience in the area and for locating additional research. It also might have been instructive, given *TNM*'s role as journal for both CNRS and NASOH, to try and ascertain Canadian versus American participation, but this was not possible without author identification. I have retained Bender's categorization of author gender for comparative purposes and have added language of publication as the CRNS is an organization inclusive of both English and French writers and *TNM* publishes articles in both languages. Prior to 2021, abstracts of articles appearing in either English or French were published with an abstract in the other language. The current practice is to have abstracts in both languages.

As this examination was precipitated by the observation of the restricted nature of the article topical coverage noted by Bender, I have retained the war/navy and mercantile categories generally as he has defined them:

War/Navy: Papers focussed on any state navy, plus papers on war, defense, diplomacy, and sovereignty.

Mercantile: Papers concerning the transporting of goods or people by sea and the transportation of goods to and from inland sites to ports, and the building of ships for that purpose.

Bender developed a measure to assess Anglocentrism. Given the mandates of the two organizations contributing to *The Northern Mariner*, I have replaced this category with a geographical breakdown for subjects. The areas are broad and are not defined simply by the Atlantic, Pacific, or Arctic coasts but by the oceans themselves. Inland waterways and Great Lakes have been grouped together. Again, some articles in the journal cover a number of these geographic areas while others are not location specific. For that reason, geographical location assignments do not mirror the number of articles in total.

Rather than impose a specific uniform periodization or those used by Bender, I have



tried to group the papers into spans which relate more closely to North American history. The period of exploration and development ending about 1800 includes the American Revolutionary War years and may be slightly swelled by those events. A second grouping covers the first half of the 19th century up to about the period of the Civil War and Confederation and again may have somewhat of a “bump” in numbers owing to the activities during the 1812-1814 and Civil War periods. The remainder of the periods take up to the first and second world wars, the period between them, and the post- or cold-war era. I have been reminded by the *Argonauta* editor that these periods are all bounded by conflicts so that even while trying to move beyond a military perspective it retains a certain dominance.

Subject categorization is not always simple and the degree of specialization is to a very great extent subjective, especially when there are overlapping identifications. This can, however, be a strength, as articles which are not easily dumped into convenient groupings can sometimes be the ones that stretch the boundaries and stimulate fresh thinking. Several articles examined had relevance in several fields and were double or triple coded; accordingly, totals do not always tally 100%. Some articles are not subject to this sort of classification analysis at all. For example, John Hattendorf’s 2017 article on the state of nautical history and Alec Douglass’s 2016 contribution on the history of Canadian nautical research are both generalist approaches spanning the whole field of nautical research—a kind of meta-history.<sup>9</sup> Again, not every article can be subject to geographical or temporal assignment either because they are more generalist approaches or are on topics that are not easily identified with specific geographical areas or periods.

Given that the sample size is less than one-seventh of that used by Dr. Bender, no attempt has been made to exhaustively create categories when a single article does not fall into a more general classification.

## Results

	Sub category	Number	%
<b>Number of papers</b>		93	
<b>Number of authors</b>		97	
<b>Single-author papers</b>		89	95.6
<b>Female author</b>		3	3.2
<b>French language</b>		6	6.5
<b>Area</b>	Atlantic	17	18.3
	Arctic	4	4.3
	Pacific	6	6.5

	Great Lakes & inland	8	8.6
	Outside N.A.	12	12.9
<b>Content</b>	War/ Navy	53	57.0
	Mercantile / economic	30	32.3
	Fishing	5	5.4
	Exploration & travel	6	6.6
	Science & Technology	8	8.6
	Shipyards and Shipbuilding	9	9.7
	Crewing and Labour	7	7.5
	Piracy and Privateering	5	5.4
<b>Period</b>	16th – 18th century	10	10.8
	19th century to 1860s	24	26.0
	1860s - 1914	9	9.7
	WW1	9	9.7
	Interwar	6	6.6
	WW2	7	7.5
	Post war / cold war	9	9.7

### Observations

For anyone who has followed *TNM* over the decade, these results should not come as a great surprise. In fact, these results, in general, differ only slightly from those found by Dr. Bender in his study of the four British journals. Certainly, *The Northern Mariner's* 89.3% dominance of two primary subject areas—naval and mercantile—resembles the pattern found in the ten-year study, although with the Canadian volumes this pattern is even more skewed with the number featuring war and navy topics being close to double that of mercantile subjects. The remaining 10.7% of the articles are lightly spread and, while it may seem as if some of the other themes such as science and shipyard post reasonable numbers, it is primarily because these areas are also counted amongst the

two dominant ones. For example, the importance of naval construction in the shipbuilding and technology areas puts many articles in more than one of the boxes. What is also striking is the extent to which these results confirm what Bender found in his ten-year study: “These two aspects are so dominant—ninety percent of all articles—that, despite the protestations to the contrary, little space or interest is left over for other approaches.”<sup>10</sup> Bender goes on to suggest that areas that are conspicuous in their lack of coverage are significant in British nautical history: fishing, yachting, port development, infrastructure, participation by marginalized groups, the sea in the arts and culture. These same areas are also important, if under-represented, components of North American nautical research and history.

Although we may grumble that the best articles are siphoned off and published in other journals dedicated to transportation history, economic history, cultural and arts studies, or social history, to what extent do we have ourselves to blame? How welcoming are we as nautical historians—noted by Bender as an aging and marginalized group whose structures of research and scholarship are much weakened—to new approaches or including new areas of research within a definition of history which seems, at least from an analysis of article and book publication, to be scarcely changed from the 1970s?

While we may consider peer review as the holy grail of publishing, it is not without its drawbacks. If the peer group consists of individuals with a narrow appreciation of the field, then articles selected or approved will tend to follow this direction. Should an article be rejected because it does not accord with the preconception that nautical research should be about either naval or mercantile concerns? Perhaps we should be engaging more with other scholars and redefining the peer group.

While institutions and programs dedicated solely to nautical history appear to be disappearing one cannot say that nautical history is following the same path. There is new and exciting work being done in the field by many who do not choose to call themselves nautical historians. They may be social historians, or economic historians—perhaps not historians at all. They may be historical geographers, cartographers, or climate scientists, or even citizen scholars, and more and more frequently they wear the hat of environmental historians. If the environment does not include the sea, it is a strange study indeed—so yes, environmental history can be nautical history. Today the work in historical research is becoming dominated by environmental studies. More than simply the flavour of the week, it is an area that is attracting attention, funding, students, and publication. And yet, like nautical history, the subject matter is defined in the widest terms. Deciding what is *not* environmental history is perhaps a more difficult task.

Let me demonstrate this shift by moving from the general to the particular. My own research concerns deal primarily with Atlantic coast matters and I am conscious that *The Northern Mariner* is often not considered as a potential publisher by writers whose work lies outside the traditional subject preferences of the journal. This was most striking for me with the recent publication of *The Greater Gulf*, a collection of eleven essays collected under the umbrella description of environmental history.<sup>11</sup> The volume advances the construct of a separate geographic area of interest with shared interests

and characteristics, all related to the sea in some way, shape, or form. The chapters all concern the Gulf of St. Lawrence and while a few might ordinarily have been candidates for publication in *The Northern Mariner*, other papers do not accord with what has been the traditional approach of the journal.

The essays include chapters exploring the relationships between Indigenous groups and 16th-century fishers in the Gulf, coastal resource control in the time of 18th-century conflict, resource development and exploitation of sea-based industry, the perception of the sea of the Gulf area in 19th-century travel literature, and the environmental basis of regional identity in popular fiction. This volume is not unique and surveys of recent publications and journals reveal several books and articles that show how authors have chosen to highlight environmental history rather than define the subject as nautical.<sup>12</sup> All these essays could—and should—be considered as both environmental history *and* as nautical history but the popular view of *The Northern Mariner* is that communicated by our publishing history. Naval and mercantile history welcome; all others not wanted on the voyage. The public perception of *The Northern Mariner* is not what we would like to *think* it is, or what we *say* it is—but rather what readers *see* that it is.

We have a choice as to whether we continue to define nautical history narrowly by filling *TNM* pages with more of the same military and mercantile content or we can look beyond our existing peer-driven biases and embrace what we say we will do in our description of the journal: provide content that truly “spans the fields of naval, political, diplomatic, social, cultural, gender, Indigenous, economic, and environmental history.”<sup>13</sup> There lies our challenge—not just for the journal and its editorial board, but for the entire field of nautical history in Canada.

---

<sup>1</sup> This seems to be a favourite research topic for nautical scholars and the journals are littered with self examination, which speaks to a lack of self-esteem for the profession. At least one complete volume has been dedicated to the subject. See Frank Broeze ed., *Maritime History at the Crossroads: A Critical Review of Recent Historiography*. St. John's 1995.

<sup>2</sup> Mike Bender, “If Maritime Historians Are in Danger of being left with their journals and not much else” (Lewis Fischer), What Can Those Journals Tell Us about Ourselves? A Ten-Year Study. *The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord* 32, no.1 (Spring 2022) 1-20. The *TNM* article is essentially a reprint of an article in *Maritime South West*, a journal edited by Bender, which expands on an earlier study. Mike Bender, “Who Sails the Seaway of Diamonds? The Ten Year Study Revisited” *Maritime South West* Vol 33 2020 199-213.

<sup>3</sup> Bender, *Ten year study* p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Alec Douglas, “Of Ships and Sealing Wax” *The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord* 16, no.3 (July 2016) 247-258.

<sup>5</sup> Depending on online editions is not without its hazards. The very first article I sought, Rodney P. Carlisle's “The American *Code Duello*,” is indexed as appearing in Vol.XXI (2011), but the online link takes you to a research note by a different author: [COLUMBUS AND THE PINZON BROTHERS PIRATES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BEFORE 1492 \(cnrs-scrn.org\)](https://cnrs-scrn.org). The index gives the same page number to both, and the Carlisle essay could not be found, reducing the number of articles examined.

---

<sup>6</sup> During the 10-year period, *TNM* published over 1100 book reviews and review articles. This is significant in that the original comment that Dr. Bender responds to is one made by Lewis Fischer suggesting that the reviews in nautical journals seem to command an inordinate amount of coverage compared with other content. Bender, *Ten year study* p. 20.

<sup>7</sup> One article appeared in three parts over separate issues of the journal but is included here as a single article

<sup>8</sup> If this information is provided earlier, it must have been only in the printed edition. Researchers using online editions are not able to access such information. On a personal note, on wishing to contact the author of an article relevant to my own research I was unable to find any information on Google Scholar (which included *TNM* articles), nor did I have enough identifying information about the individual to narrow down an online search of a relatively common name.

<sup>9</sup> John B. Hattendorff, "Ubi Sumus? Twenty-five years later" *The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord* 27, no.1 (January 2017) 1-13. Alec Douglas, "Of Ships and Sealing Wax" *The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord* 16, no.3 (July 2016) 247-258.

<sup>10</sup> Bender, *Ten year study* p.15.

<sup>11</sup> Claire E. Campbell, Edward MacDonald and Brian Payne eds., *The Greater Gulf: Essays in the Environmental History of the Gulf of St. Lawrence* Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens 2019.

<sup>12</sup> Other examples include Jamin Wells, *Shipwrecked: Coastal Disasters and the Making of the American Beach*. Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press 2020, and several chapters in Claire Campbell and Robert Summerby-Murray eds., *Land and Sea: Environmental History in Atlantic Canada*. Fredericton: Acadiansis Press 2013

<sup>13</sup> [Canadian Nautical Research Society - The Northern Mariner \(cnrs-scrn.org\)](http://cnrs-scrn.org)

Harry Holman is the former Archivist of Prince Edward Island. A graduate of the University of Alberta and Queen's University with a degree in law, he worked in historic resources administration at both the national and provincial levels. He has contributed to academic and popular journals including recent articles and reviews in *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord* and *Argonauta*. Harry currently maintains a website dedicated primarily to the nautical history of Prince Edward Island and Gulf of St. Lawrence found at [www.sailstrait.wordpress.com](http://www.sailstrait.wordpress.com)

## The Potsdam Conference and the remaining U-boats

by Air Commodore Derek Waller, RAF (Ret'd)



On 23 May 1945, just two weeks after the end of the war in Europe, the USSR's Marshal Stalin sent messages to American President Truman and UK Prime Minister Churchill making it clear that, despite no German naval vessels having surrendered to Soviet forces, he expected at least one third of Germany's surviving warships—including U-boats—to be allocated to the Soviet Union:

*According to data of the Soviet Military and Naval Command, Germany, on the basis of the capitulation act, has surrendered all her naval and merchant vessels to the British and the Americans. I have to inform you that the Germans have refused to surrender to the Russians even a single naval or merchant vessel having directed their entire fleet for surrender to the Anglo-American armed forces.*

*Under such circumstances, naturally, there arises the question that the Soviet Union be allocated its share of military and merchant vessels of Germany as it was done, in due time, in respect to Italy. The Soviet Government considers that it can rightfully and justly count on the minimum of one third of the naval and merchant vessels of Germany. (1)*

Mr Churchill replied to Stalin on 27 May:

*It seems to me that these matters should form part of the general discussions which ought to take place between us and President Truman at the earliest possible date, and I thank you for giving this outline of your views beforehand. (2)*

President Truman, after first assuring Mr Churchill that they were in general agreement on the matter, replied to Stalin in similar vein on 29 May:

*Thank you for your suggestion regarding surrendered German ships contained in your message dated 23 May 1945. It appears to me that this is an appropriate subject for discussion by the three of us at the forthcoming meeting at which time I am sure a solution can be reached which will be fully acceptable to all of us. (3)*

In the meantime, Stalin had raised the matter on 27 May with Mr Harry Hopkins during the latter's informal mission to Moscow on President Truman's behalf. The notes of the meeting record the strong line taken by Stalin in respect of the surviving German warships:

*As regards to the German fleet which had caused so much damage to Leningrad and other Soviet ports not one vessel had been turned over to the Russians despite the fact that the fleet had surrendered. He [Stalin] added that he had sent a message to the President and Prime Minister suggesting that at least one-third of*

*the German Navy and merchant marine thus surrendered be turned over to the Soviet Union. The rest could be disposed of by Great Britain and the United States as they saw fit. He added that if the Soviet Union had been entitled to a part of the Italian fleet they certainly had more right to their fair share of the German fleet since they had suffered five million casualties in this war. He said that the Soviet Government had certain information leading it to believe that both the United States and England intended to reject the Soviet request and he must say that if this turned out to be true it would be very unpleasant. (4)*

Mr Hopkins' response to Stalin, as reported to the President, was neutral:

*From conversations he had had with Admiral King [the US Navy's Chief of Naval Operations] he was able to state that the United States had no desire to retain any portion of the German fleet and merely wished to examine the vessels for possible new inventions or technical improvements. After that we were prepared to sink the share turned over to us. He also said that he had always understood that the fleet was to be divided between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain and that insofar as the United States was concerned there was no objection to whatever disposition the Soviet Government wished to make with its share. He added that he thought that this matter could be definitely settled at the forthcoming meeting of the three Heads of Government. (4)*

It was clear that Stalin was intent on making the running concerning the division of the German fleet, but that such an approach was not unexpected by either the USA or the UK. It was therefore agreed between the UK and USA that the topic should be discussed at the forthcoming Potsdam Conference (code named "Terminal"), with the UK advising the US Acting Secretary of State on 1 June:

*Mr Eden [The British Foreign Secretary] has asked me to tell you that in view of Marshal Stalin's message about surrendered German naval and merchant ships, His Majesty's Government propose the addition of the following item to Section 2 of the Agenda for the forthcoming meeting of Heads of Governments: "Disposal of German Fleet and Merchant Ships" (5)*

As the issue of the German naval fleet was thus to be an Agenda item at the Conference, due to start on 17 July, both the US and the UK staffs produced briefing notes for their respective delegations, with the USA's paper being produced by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff because it was considered to be primarily a military matter.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advice to President Truman dated 10 July stated their preferred solution in relation to the disposition and distribution of the German Fleet:

- a. *Except for a limited number of ships for experimental and test purposes, all naval vessels should be destroyed, i.e. sunk on the high seas or scrapped.*
- b. *Failing agreement by the nations represented on the European Advisory Commission as to this disposition, then the United States should press for:*

*(1) Agreement that all capital ships, and also submarines be destroyed while smaller craft and more lightly armed vessels be shared equally by the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and France, or failing this*

*(2) Agreement that one-fourth share of each category of ships in the German fleet be assigned to each of these four major powers.*

c. *In any event, the United States should press for the sinking of German submarines. (6)*

This final piece of US military advice to the President concerning the U-boats that had surrendered had been strongly emphasized in an earlier JCS Report dated 5 July:

*The German surface ships are not a particular menace, whereas the German submarines are a considerable potential menace to world peace. The United States should endeavour to obtain agreement to sinking these. (7)*

The JCS suggestion that France be allocated a share of the German Navy's surviving surface fleet was not a new idea, especially as the French had been lobbying the Americans and British on the topic since mid-1944. While France had become a member of the European Advisory Commission in November 1944, it was invited neither to join the 'Big Three' nor to participate in the Potsdam Conference. This situation did not please the French Government and had a direct impact on the later debates about the possible allocation to France of surrendered German surface warships and U-boats.

The US military authorities were nevertheless sympathetic to the case for France to be allocated a share of the surviving German naval vessels, a position which had first become apparent when Stalin informed Mr Harry Hopkins, during their meeting in Moscow on 30 May, that he had received a suggestion from General Eisenhower:

*That a naval commission composed of the four countries [USA, USSR, UK and France] should be set up to consider the disposal and division of the German fleet. (8)*

This suggestion was emphasized again on 22 June when a message from the US Political Advisor in Germany to the Acting US Secretary of State in Washington included the statement:

*With reference to the division by agreement between the US, UK, USSR and France of the naval and merchant fleets of Germany, Ambassador Pauley has informed General Eisenhower that ... it is his view that as long as the US is at war with Japan the division of both the German naval and merchant fleets is strictly a military matter. (9)*

Stung by his exclusion from the earlier Three-Power Yalta Conference in February



1945, General de Gaulle was very keen that France should be included as a full member of the Potsdam Conference, so rather than challenging the three Heads of State concerning the allocation of German naval vessels, he first chose to argue for France's place at the conference table with the new American President via diplomatic channels.

Despite a great deal of pressure, and despite the US State Department's sympathetic views, the question of French participation was never formally raised during the preliminary negotiations about the forthcoming conference between President Truman, Mr Churchill, and Stalin. Indeed, Churchill took successful steps to discourage Truman from a possible face-to-face meeting with de Gaulle before the Conference, and it is clear that neither Churchill nor Stalin would have welcomed the General's participation. Thus, President Truman did not pursue the matter, particularly as he was in no doubt about Churchill's views after the visit to London in late May of Mr Joseph Davies, the President's personal representative, whose report to the President dated 12 June recorded:

*As to France, he [Mr Churchill] was bitter. He was completely fed up with de Gaulle and out of patience. He [General de Gaulle] ought to be "brought up" sharply and given to understand clearly that he cannot act arbitrarily and inconsiderately. (10)*

Despite de Gaulle's efforts, the Potsdam Conference between the UK, the USA, and the USSR did not therefore include France, and the Leaders' discussions about the division of the surviving German naval vessels concentrated on the allocation of the surface ships and submarines between just the Three Powers.

The US military view concerning the allocation of German naval vessels to France which had been set out in the US JCS advice to President Truman on 10 July was therefore modified. This occurred during the discussions that took place on board the US Navy cruiser USS *Augusta* which, between 7 and 14 July, transported President Truman from the USA to Europe when, in connection with the future of German surface vessels, he agreed with his Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, on a position:

*He believed that captured German war vessels should be divided as equally as possible among the Three Powers at the earliest practicable date. (11)*

Thus ended the original American desire to ensure that France was allocated a share of the surviving vessels of the German Navy.

As far as the British position was concerned, there were two important papers relating to the future of the German naval vessels. The first of these was a Foreign Office briefing note for the UK Delegation to the Conference dated 6 July, which stated:

*It would clearly be in the interest of this country, and in the interest of the World as a whole, to scrap the entire German fleet. While there is unfortunately little chance of the Russians agreeing to scrap as a general policy it is suggested that we ought, if only for technical reasons, to support strongly any American initiative proposing the scrapping of the entire fleet.*

*The French claim to a share in the German fleet, which has already been put forward semi-officially to the Admiralty, is weak in equity. But it is in our interest to preserve good relationships between the Royal Navy and the French Navy. Accordingly, it is submitted that we should allow the French a few ships. (12)*

However, this latter statement was not supported by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr Brendan Bracken, when he wrote on 7 July:

*The Russian contribution at sea does not justify claim to one third of fleet, and the French claim to German warships has few merits. (13)*

The second major pre-Conference UK statement of policy was an Admiralty's paper on the disposal of the German fleet submitted to the Cabinet on 7 July:

*The Admiralty consider the scrapping of the combat units of the German Fleet to be in the best interests both of the Royal Navy and of world peace.*

*Marshal Stalin bids for a minimum of one-third on the grounds of reason and justice. The exertions and losses of the Red Navy give no foundation for a claim to one-third. The Russian contribution at sea has been almost negligible. The Russians must therefore justify their claim on the general, not the naval contribution of the USSR to the common victory.*

*The disposal of the surrendered German ships is a matter on which the French, who will be absent from "Terminal", will presumably claim a right to speak. They have unofficially intimated that they will ask for some destroyers and U-boats. On the other hand, a French claim to German warships has few merits since the parlous state of the French Fleet today is largely due to their own defaults.*

*The Admiralty's aim is to satisfy British requirements and to keep U-boats out of undesirable hands, particularly Russian hands. It is believed that the Americans, also, will have the latter objective. As the German warships are all in our hands, our bargaining position is extremely strong.*

*If the Russian desire for a division has to be met, we should claim our full share. The Russians, for reasons of prestige, are likely to be tempted by the offer of cruisers and destroyers. We do not covet the surface combat ships and should insist on taking our share primarily out of the U-boat fleet. (14)*

The Admiralty's Cabinet Paper then suggested that while the Russians should be allocated only 10 U-boats, the British and Americans should be allocated 65 each and, contrary to the views of The First Lord, that six should be allocated to France. The stated British requirement was for a large number of U-boats for experimental purposes, most of which would be used in extended explosive trials, an action which it was hoped would be seen as tantamount to scrapping them. It was assumed that the United States would require the same number for the same purposes, and it was believed that this somewhat speculative suggestion would attract American support. The Cabinet Paper

also stressed that if the Russians contested the allocation of 65 U-boats each to Britain and America, they should be reminded that a Red Army Press Release in March had announced the capture of 45 U-boats in Danzig. This was known to be exaggerated, but it was expected that the Russians might find it embarrassing to retract the Red Army's announcement.

The Cabinet Meeting on 12 July considered the Admiralty proposals and, although no red line was formally put through them at the meeting, the suggested U-boat allocation figures of 65 each for the USA and the UK did not survive and never re-appeared. The more important point was agreed by the Cabinet:

*So far as concerned the German fleet, we should strongly support the American view that there should be a wholesale scrapping of combat units with the exception of vessels which were required for experimental or immediate operational purposes. If, however, the Russians refused to accept this proposal, we should suggest a division of the German fleet on the lines indicated, the main effect of which was to give the Russians the minimum number of U-boats. (15)*

The formal conclusion of the Cabinet Meeting was that the proposal with regard to the disposal of the German fleet should be adopted as a basis for any negotiations at the forthcoming Conference.

Thus, though the future of the Kriegsmarine and the remaining U-boats was just one small part of a whole series of momentous political and military subjects to be considered at what was essentially a peace conference, the Potsdam Conference nevertheless set out the way ahead for the 156 U-boats that had surrendered at the end of the European war. There was no question of the survival of most of the German naval vessels, including the U-boats. The question was how this was to be achieved.

The first Plenary (i.e., leaders) Meeting of the Potsdam Conference was held on 17 July and, to emphasize his concerns and rile Churchill, Stalin almost immediately raised the question of the division of the German naval fleet which, he said, the UK and the USA had agreed would be discussed. However, there are three slightly different records of the debate:

The US 'Thompson Minutes':

*Stalin asked why does Churchill refuse to give Russia her share of the German fleet?*

*Churchill exclaimed "Why?" and went on to say that he thought that the fleet should be destroyed or shared.*

*Stalin said, let's divide it. If Mr Churchill wishes, he can sink his share. (16)*

The US 'Cohen Notes':

*Stalin: If you are in such an obedient mood today, Mr Prime Minister, I should like*

*to know whether you will share with us the German fleet.*

*Churchill: We will share it with you or sink it. (17)*

The UK Minutes:

*Premier Stalin asked why Mr Churchill did not agree that Russia should have a third of the German Fleet.*

*Mr Churchill said that this was not the position. It was, however, for consideration whether the German Fleet should be divided up, or whether it would be sunk.*

*Premier Stalin said that in his view the German Fleet should be divided up. If other countries wished to sink the ships which made up the share allotted to them they could do so, but he did not intend that the ships allotted to Russia should be sunk. (18)*

The parallel first Meeting of Foreign Secretaries was held on 18 July and, not surprisingly, Mr Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, suggested that the disposal of the German fleet should be added to the Agenda of the forthcoming second Plenary Meeting. In response, Mr Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, said:

*That this was not a particularly difficult issue and could conveniently be left until later in the Conference (19)*

To which Mr Molotov replied that if the issue was simple there was much to be said for disposing of it without delay. It was however agreed that it would not be included in the second Plenary, but at one soon after.

On the same day, 18 July, Mr Churchill had lunch with President Truman, and the former's note of their conversation records that:

*The President asked how I thought we should handle the Russian request for the division of the German Fleet. I said I found it hard to deny the Russians the right to keep their third of the Fleet afloat if they needed it. We British should not have any use for our third of the warships. The President said that the Americans would take their share, but it would be of no use to them. I made it clear that the case of the U-boats must be considered separately, as they were nasty things to have knocking about in large numbers. He seemed to agree. (20)*

The second Meeting of Foreign Secretaries was held on 19 July, with one of its purposes to agree on the Agenda for the third Plenary to be held later that day. Mr Molotov was keen for an early discussion about the paper he had produced about the future of the German Navy, and Mr Byrnes (US Secretary of State) and Mr Eden both agreed that it should be included. The Soviet proposal was short and to the point, comprising just five paragraphs and, predictably, including this proposal:

*One third of the total German Navy shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. (21)*

The third Plenary Meeting was held on the evening of 19 July and, under Agenda Item No. 6, included a long debate between the three Allied leaders, but primarily Stalin and Churchill, about the future of the German naval fleet. Stalin opened the discussion with a reference to the Molotov paper, and Mr Churchill, who was determined to take a hard line, assured him that though he had no objection to the Soviet proposal that the German naval fleet should be shared, he linked this to the need for a satisfactory outcome to the Conference as a whole:

*He did not want to approach the question of the German Fleet from any judicial standpoint with exact definitions, but rather to try and reach a fair and friendly agreement between the three Powers as part of a general settlement of the problems before them. The major part of the German Fleet was now in British hands; and, assuming that the Three Powers came to a friendly general settlement of the affairs before the Conference, he would not oppose a fair division of the German Fleet. (22)*

Mr Churchill then turned his attention specifically to the subject of the U-boats:

*It seemed to him that the disposal of the German U-boats was in a rather different position from the other vessels. U-boats had a limited war use. He considered that the U-boats should be destroyed or sunk. However, some of the most modern U-boats had devices of interest to all Three Powers, and these should be shared. He therefore suggested that as part of a final settlement, most of the U-boats should be sunk, and the small balance required for research should be shared.*

*As regards the other units of the German Fleet, if the Conference came to a friendly general settlement of their problems, he was prepared to divide them equally, for he would welcome the appearance of the Russians on the seas of the world.*

*He had made a distinction which he regarded as important between the German surface fleet and the U-boats. He knew that Premier Stalin would appreciate the sensitivities of the people of an island like Great Britain, which grew far less than two-thirds of its food. We have suffered greatly from U-boats in two wars, in a way that no other nation had suffered. Twice we had been brought to the brink of disaster by U-boat campaigns, and the U-boats were not a popular weapon with the British people.*

*He would strongly urge that a considerable portion of the U-boats should be sunk, and that the rest should be shared alike: the number kept by the Three Powers should be a token; more in order to spread technical knowledge than to keep large numbers in existence. As Great Britain had been subjected to terrible assaults by U-boats, we did not welcome any nation expanding in this form of naval construction. He hoped that Premier Stalin and President Truman would pardon his emphasising our special position in this matter. (22)*

Stalin's response was a significant u-turn in Soviet policy as well as a major

breakthrough in the debate about the future of the remaining U-boats:

*That he too also favoured sinking a large proportion of the German U-boats and was in agreement with this view. (22)*

President Truman said that he too was agreeable to a three-way division of the German naval surface fleet, as well as the sinking of a large proportion of the U-boats.

Once the principle of the need for a three-way split of the surface fleet had been recognized by President Truman and Mr Churchill, Stalin agreed that the details should be settled at the end of the Conference. As a result, the question was put on hold, although the need for progress was briefly mentioned yet again by Mr Molotov at the fifth Meeting of Foreign Secretaries on 22 July:

*Mr Molotov referred to other subjects on which the Soviet Delegation wished to see some further progress made at an early date. It was pointed out that the question of the German Fleet was one for discussion for the Plenary Meeting, and Mr Byrnes indicated that the United States Delegation intended to put forward proposals on this subject. (23)*

The topic was next raised at the ninth Plenary Meeting held on 25 July, where it was the first Agenda item. However, Mr Churchill and President Truman stated that their staffs were still working on the detailed proposals, and Stalin agreed:

*It was agreed that further consideration of this matter should be deferred until detailed proposals were available. (24)*

Action concerning the disposal of the German naval fleet then accelerated as the Potsdam Conference approached its close, and the staffs of each of the three Allied delegations produced their final position papers on the topic.

The US Delegation's Working Paper of 29 July stated:

*It is agreed that the German fleet shall at once be divided equally among the USSR, the UK, and the US. A large proportion of the German submarines shall be destroyed, a small number being retained for experimental and training purposes. (25)*

The Soviet Delegation, for the first time, dealt with the surface vessels and submarines separately, and proposed in its paper of 30 July:

*One third of the total strength of the German surface navy shall be transferred to the Soviet Union.*

*A larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. A part of the submarine fleet viz. submarines presenting the greatest interest from the technical standpoint shall be preserved and divided between the USSR, Great Britain and the USA. (26)*

The paper by the British Delegation of 30 July took a more detailed approach and, once again, raised the issue of allotting surface vessels and U-boats to France. This was a topic which had been discussed between the new British Prime Minister, Mr Clement Attlee, the new British Foreign Secretary, Mr Ernest Bevin, and senior Foreign Office officials on the previous day:

*The Foreign Secretary asked whether difficulty would arise later if a decision was taken at this Conference about the disposal of the German Fleet, without providing for the French to have some share of it. (27)*

In response, a statement was slightly economical with the truth:

*It was pointed out that the distribution which had been suggested by the Admiralty, and approved by a Cabinet decision of the late Government, had made provision for a share to be given to the French. (27)*

While the Admiralty was equivocal about the question of German warships to the French, the Foreign Office took a far more positive line, advising Mr Bevin on 28 July:

*The French claim to a share of the German warships was not mentioned at the Plenary discussion and the British Delegation consider it impractical to raise it now. It seems to be deliberate Russian policy to ignore the French. Conversely it seems to be in our interests to ensure that France plays her full part as fourth partner in German affairs. The Foreign Office would therefore suggest that we should try to obtain some German warships for the French. (28)*

In the light of this, the British proposal, which alluded to the discussions between the three Leaders on 19 July, was that:

*It was agreed on the 19th July that the German surface ships should be shared equally between the Three Powers. The British Delegation suggest that consideration should now be given to allotting a share to France which is an equal party to the terms of surrender for Germany and is a full member of the Control Council for Germany.*

*At the same time it was agreed in principle that the German U-boats should be dealt with separately, the greater part being destroyed. A token number would be retained for equal division among the Three Powers for purposes of research. The question of a French share of the retained U-boats should also be considered. (29)*

The tenth Meeting of Foreign Secretaries was held on 30 July and, in the light of the three slightly differing final position statements:

*It was agreed that a Technical Sub-Committee should be established to examine the questions raised and to report to an early meeting of Foreign Secretaries. (30)*

This Technical Sub-Committee was led by three senior Allied naval officers. The British

Rear Admiral Edward D. B. McCarthy, the American Vice Admiral Charles M. Cooke, and the Russian Admiral of the Fleet Nikolai Kuznetsov. The latter outranked his colleagues and was Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy; his presence showed just how seriously the Soviet Union was approaching the question of the final disposal of the surviving German naval vessels.

At the eleventh Plenary Meeting held on 31 July, Stalin, becoming increasingly impatient, urged that a definite decision be made about the question of the German fleet. Even though the report of the Technical Sub-Committee was not yet available to the leaders, Stalin again stated his view that it had already been agreed that Russia would get one-third of the German naval fleet, except submarines, the majority of which should be sunk.

In response, the US Secretary of State advised that:

*The Committee which had been set up to study this question were meeting later that evening and hoped to reach agreement. He thought it would save time to await their Report. (31)*

The meeting of the Technical Sub-Committee also took place on 31 July with Admiral Kuznetsov as its Chairman, and the elusive Minutes dated 1 August, which neither the FRUS authors nor Butler & Pelly were able to locate, record a lively discussion about the division of the German fleet. There was a lengthy debate about the surface warships, which initially became bogged down in unnecessary detail and, yet again, emphasized the British view that some should be allocated to France. Predictably this did not find favour with the Soviet Delegation, with the Minutes recording:

*Considerable discussion followed on this point. The Soviet Representatives pointing out that at the Plenary Meeting [on 19 July] it was decided that one-third of the German surface warships should go to the Soviet Union and that this Sub-Committee is conferring on that basis alone. The question of giving a share to France was not connected with the agreement for transferring one-third to the USSR. There were no reasons for becoming involved in this question today as full agreement had already been reached on this division of one-third. (32)*

As far as the U-boats were concerned, the British Delegation once again raised the issue of allocating a share to France. Fortunately, the sting was taken out of the debate by it being agreed that the principle of any allocation of warships to France would be raised in the Sub-Committee's final report. This was then followed by a discussion focussed on the number to be retained.

Admiral McCarthy, supported by Admiral Cooke, suggested that the Three Powers should each retain just six—which, with a possible allocation of two to France—would give a total of 20. In contrast, whilst ignoring the question of any U-boats being allocated to France, with which he disagreed, Admiral Kuznetsov said that there were three interesting types (presumably Types XVII, XXI and XXIII), and that the Soviet Union would like to have 10 of each, giving them a total of 30. The reasons given for this proposal were:



*That it would be necessary for experimenting with these submarines that some of these types should be delivered to industrial enterprises to be taken to pieces and examined.*

*Others would be required for operating tests, sending some to the north and some to the south to see how they react to conditions.*

*One type would not guarantee results as any accident would destroy the value of the test. (32)*

Unsurprisingly, the Soviet proposal did not attract support from the American and British Admirals—especially the latter. Counter arguments were that this would involve some 60% (90) of the surviving seaworthy U-boats, which was contrary to the agreements already made during the Conference, that there were insufficient numbers of the ‘*three interesting types*’, and that there would be major problems concerning the supply of spare parts. In particular, the Foreign Office representative on the British Delegation stressed:

*We should base ourselves on what was said on 19 July when Mr Churchill made a very forceful appeal for the destruction of the greater part of the U-boats. He explained the extreme sensitiveness of the British people towards this weapon which had twice brought Britain to the brink of disaster. Generalissimo Stalin said at the same time that he agreed and favoured sinking a large proportion of the German submarines. The British Government had never contemplated that the Sub-Committee had authority to propose the retention of anything like half of the German U-boat fleet, and that in following the basis of Mr Churchill’s remarks we should only maintain a number of something in the nature of 10%. (32)*

It was clear that there was no meeting of minds amongst the Admirals as to how many U-boats should be retained and, to break the deadlock, Admiral Kuznetsov suggested that the question be remitted to the Allied leaders for a final decision:

*The British Delegation suggested that the number of submarines left should not exceed 20%, while the Soviet representative did not consider this enough, the final decision being left to the Big Three. (32)*

The Technical Sub-Committee’s Report, which was submitted on 1 August, included the following recommendations:

*The total strength of the German surface navy shall be divided equally among the USSR, UK and US.*

*The British representatives expressed the view that a portion of the German Navy should be allotted to France and that, therefore, full agreement with the above principle must be subject to final decision of the Plenary Conference.*

*The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk.*

*The Committee are not able to make a recommendation as regards the number of submarines to be preserved for experimental and technical purposes.*

*It is the opinion of the British and American members that not more than 30 submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the USSR, UK and US for experimental and technical purposes.*

*It is the view of the Russian members that this number is too small for their requirements and that USSR should receive about 30 submarines for its own experimental and technical purposes. (33)*

The Report was taken as Agenda Item No. 14 of the eleventh Meeting of Foreign Secretaries held on 1 August and, in an unexpected meeting of minds, there was no debate whatsoever about the allocation of either surface warships or submarines to France. In respect of the surviving surface warships, the Minutes of the Meeting recorded that:

*Mr Byrnes said that the first question on which agreement had not been reached in the Committee was the distribution of warships.*

*Mr Molotov recalled that it had already been decided at a Plenary Meeting that the German warships should be divided into three parts.*

*Mr Bevin said that, as regards the warships, he was prepared to agree a division into thirds. (34)*

The debate concerning the submarines was not quite so simple; Mr Ernest Bevin, the new British Foreign Secretary, made a very strong statement on behalf of both the UK and the USA saying, as recorded in the Minutes of the Meeting:

*On submarines, Mr Bevin said that the question was how many should be destroyed. Mr Churchill had said that only a token number should be retained. The British and United States Delegations suggested that only 30 submarines should be preserved. This was a matter on which the British people felt very strongly, since no less than 30,000 British seamen had lost their lives during the war by U-boat warfare alone while carrying supplies by sea to Russia and elsewhere. On this point the British and United States Delegations were not prepared to make any concession. No German submarines should be retained except for experimental purposes, and in his opinion 30 was adequate for those purposes.*

*Mr Molotov said that he was prepared to agree. (34)*

As a result, after all the many debates about the future of the German Navy since the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, the three Foreign Secretaries finally agreed:

*That thirty submarines should be retained for distribution among the Three Powers, and the remainder destroyed. (34)*

At the twelfth Plenary Meeting, also held on 1 August, and without further debate, the Allied Leaders endorsed the conclusions that had been reached by their respective Foreign Secretaries earlier that day concerning the disposal of the surface vessels and submarines of the German naval fleet.

Immediately after this, Mr Clement Attlee, the new British Prime Minister, wrote to Mr Churchill:

*The Conference is ending tonight in a good atmosphere. I would like to let you know the broad results before the communiqué is issued. We have, of course, been building on the foundation laid by you, and there has been no change of policy. (35)*

The letter ended with a postscript:

*We have reached a satisfactory agreement on the German Fleet, especially on U-boats. Of these all are to be sunk except 30 which are to be divided equally between the Three Powers for experimental and technical purposes. (35)*

The final result of all these high-level political discussions was the production of the Proceedings of the Potsdam Heads of State Conference which had taken place in Berlin between 17 July and 2 August 1945. In respect of the surviving U-boats, the Proceedings formally recorded that the UK, the USA and the USSR had concluded that:

*The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the USSR, UK and USA for experimental and technical purposes. (36)*

Thus, by the end of the Potsdam Conference, the British and Americans had achieved what they wanted, albeit that no vessels had been allocated to France. As expected, Stalin had raised the issue of what to do with the German warships that had surrendered, and he had achieved his objective that the Soviet Union should be allocated one third of the surface ships, although he had made a major concession in respect of the U-boats.

It is interesting to speculate just why Stalin was prepared to compromise in respect of his claim to a one-third share of the surviving U-boats. Perhaps it was because he recognized that almost all the U-boats which had surrendered were by then located in the UK, or that he realized that Mr Churchill and the British Government held very strong views about the need for their destruction, or that there were other more important matters on which agreement was necessary. However, the explanation may be much simpler: despite the earlier exaggerated statement that the Red Army had captured 45 U-boats in Danzig in March 1945, they had in fact captured eight almost-complete Type XXI U-boats and had already taken early steps to incorporate them into the Soviet Navy's Baltic Fleet.

Additionally, although the British and Americans did not become aware of the full details

until early 1946, the Russians had completely dismantled the Schichau shipyard in Danzig in 1945 and had moved everything to the Soviet Union as war reparations. During that process, they had gained access to a large number of prefabricated Type XXI U-boat sections which, though earmarked for specific U-boats, had not yet reached the keel-laying/assembly stage. This meant that the Soviet Navy had sufficient prefabricated sections and other parts, as well as the assembly jigs and facilities, to complete at least another 12 Type XXI U-boats, plans for the final keel-laying and building of which had been underway before Danzig was captured.

One of Stalin's post-war priorities was to create a blue-water navy, and the large, high-speed, ocean-going, high-tech German Type XXI U-boat was a prime attraction for the Soviet Navy. He secretly already had in his possession sufficient examples of this type of U-boat, and it is most likely that this fact was what enabled him to compromise during the debates at Potsdam about the number of U-boats to be retained.

Of the 156 U-boats that surrendered at the end of the European war in May 1945, 10 were allocated to each of the USSR, the USA and the UK, one was returned to the Dutch Navy, 115 were sunk off N. Ireland, two were sunk off the north-east coast of the USA, one was unilaterally taken over by France, four were unilaterally taken over by Norway, and three were scrapped in the Norwegian ports where they had surrendered.

Finally, in respect of France, its ambition to obtain six U-boats was eventually achieved. One had been taken over unilaterally, two were transferred on loan by the Royal Navy from the UK allocation, and three others, which were originally war losses located in French ports, were repaired locally and commissioned into the French Navy.

*Arundel, W. Sussex, UK*

*January 2023*

### **Specific Sources:**

1. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 1, Document No. 386
2. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 1, Document No. 141
3. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 1, Document No. 143
4. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 1, Document No. 25
5. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 1, Document No. 148
6. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The

Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 1, Document Nos. 391 and 392

7. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1:1942 - 45 - The European Theater, Kings College London, UPA Microfilm Project (1981), Reel 9 - Report by the Joint Staff Planners, JCS 820/10, 5 July 1945, Page 25

8. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 1, Document No. 27

9. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 1, Document No. 389

10. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 1, Document No. 33

11. The Admiral Leahy Papers – US Navy History and Heritage Command, Washington DC – Preparations (at sea) for Agenda at Potsdam Conference 1945

12. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 -The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 10

13. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 10i

14. TNA Kew, On-Line Cabinet Papers - CAB 66/67/17 – Cabinet Paper – CP (45) 67 – 7 July 1945

15. TNA Kew, On-Line Cabinet Papers – CAB 65/53/14 - Cabinet Conclusions – CM 14 (45) – 12 July 1945

16. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 2, Document No. 710 (9)

17. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 2, Document No. 710 (10)

18. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 170

19. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 178

20. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 181

21. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 2, Document No. 1007

22. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 194
23. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 224
24. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 271
25. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 2, Document No. 1011
26. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 2, Document No. 1013
27. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 450
28. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 466
29. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 2, Document No. 1014
30. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 469
31. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 495
32. The Admiral Charles Maynard Cooke Papers, Hoover Library, Stanford University, California, USA – Collection No. 68005, Box No. 21 – Disposition of the German Navy & Merchant Marine 1945
33. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) - Diplomatic Papers - The Potsdam Conference 1945, Vol 2, Document No. 1015
34. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 509
35. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 522
36. Documents on British Policy Overseas – Butler & Pelly (HMSO 1984) – Series 1, Volume 1 - The Conference at Potsdam 1945, Document No. 603

## Shaped by the sea: The maritime world as transformative for work, culture, ideas, networks

CNRS Conference 2023 accepted papers



It's exciting to see the list of accepted papers for the August 2023 CNRS conference, and I look forward to publishing more details about the gathering in our Summer issue.

- Joana Baço, “Little Birds, Long Voyages: The Presence of Companion Birds Abroad European Ships, 17th to 19th Century”
- Christopher M. Bell, “The Battle of the Atlantic and the Delay in Closing the ‘Air Gap’”
- Isabel Campbell, “The RCN’s 1948 northern voyages and contributions to oceanographic research during the Cold War”
- Alex Comber, “Wrecking the Terror: Drowning Breadalbane”
- Wes Cross, “Not Lost at Sea: The Ajax Club Legacy”
- Richard Goette, “Canada, the US, and the Defence of Newfoundland and Labrador during the 1950s”
- Erika Laanela, “A Biography of His Majesty's Ship *Saphire*, sunk in Bay Bulls in 1696”
- Gonçalo C. Lopes, “Lanterns and Windowpanes Made of Shell: The Case of the Frigate Santo António de Taná (1697)”
- Chris Madsen, “French Interest in Philip Colomb's 1879 Naval Wargame The Duel”
- Thomas Malcomson, “The Efficient Cook: The “Cookery Manual” of the Upper Lakes & St. Lawrence Transportation Company”
- Salvatore Martinelli, “Navigating the High Seas: A Comparative Analysis of the ‘Atlante idrogeografico ed astronomic’ and ‘Portolan Atlas’ in the 16th Century”
- Michael Moir, “As Scarce as a Snowball in Hades: Shipbuilding and the Search for Skilled Labour during the First World War”
- Jeff Noakes, “‘This matter will have to be given much careful thought’: Soviet Torpedoes and Mines Captured in North Korea”
- Roger Sarty, “An Albertan's Discovery of the Maritimes: George Stanley in New Brunswick, 1936-42”
- Johnathan Thayer, “Merchant Seamen and the Parameters of Involuntary Servitude”
- Meaghan Walker, “Buying Clothes in Bonavista: A Fisher Community’s Consumption of Ready-made Apparel in the Late-nineteenth Century”



## **Draft minutes of the Council meeting**

held using videoconference software, Friday 22 July 2022

**Present:** Michael Moir, President; Tom Malcomson, First Vice President; Isabel Campbell, Second Vice President; Errolyn Humphreys, Treasurer; Ian Yeates, Associate Treasurer; Richard Gimblett, Past President; Richard Goette, Secretary; Sam McLean, Membership Secretary; Faye Kert, Honorary Member; Meaghan Walker, Walter Lewis, Jeff Noakes, Chris Perry, Winston “Kip” Scoville, Margaret Schotte, Ambjörn Adomeit, Councillors; and Roger Sarty, Chair of the Editorial Board.

### **Calling to Order**

Michael called the meeting to order at 11:03 hrs.

### **Approval of Agenda**

Chris moved, Isabel seconded. Carried.

### **Minutes of Council’s Previous Meeting**

Isabel moved, Tom seconded acceptance of the minutes for 5 March 2022. Carried.

**Business Arising out of Council’s Previous Meeting** No business arising.

### **Financial report and statements**

Errolyn provided the financial statements – comparative balance sheet and comparative income statement up to end-May.

Ian moved to accept the documents, Margaret seconded.

### **Discussion:**

Errolyn desires to make the financial statements concise yet detailed. She will look into how easy it is to keep the line items as they are but simplify the basic form with more detailed appendices breaking things down. Isabel asked about the bank and credit card charges, which are over \$600. What kind of credit card charges do we have? Errolyn: a lot of people renew memberships using Moneris, which charges a monthly fee to use their service. She also has to issue paper cheques and deposit received cheques, which result in a bank charge. Isabel inquired if we are paying too much. Is there a way of reducing this charge, perhaps going to e-transfers? Errolyn: we are paying \$50-60 per month for credit card payments. The Society’s requirement for two signatures for payments negates the ability to go digital (only one person would have signing authority – who would this be?). Isabel: with respect to workload, does it still make sense to keep what we have or go electronic? Errolyn: we have to take the risk factor into account. Several members like sending in paper cheques and would be turned off by mandatory electronic payments. Another big problem with going online is that the log-in has to go to several people, making it difficult to identify who was responsible for a transaction (business risk). Isabel commended Errolyn’s clear explanation: this sounds reasonable to maintain the monthly charge to ensure financial accountability (i.e., being able to



track payments, signing authority, etc.) and for risk reduction and service to older members.

Motion carried.

Michael discussed his draft budget for 2022 (pdf 6 in “supporting docs”). It included the last few years to show the changes over time. Donations are only at about \$1,200, though he is hopeful that fall membership renewals will lead to this number rising. Under expenses, Michael has budgeted for prizes but this anticipates receiving student papers for TNM vol 31. For Pritchard prize there is \$300 for student paper. Michael noted there is no need to use \$2,500 for funding travel to conferences. We will operate with a deficit this year, though it will be slightly smaller as TNM will produce five issues vice six this year.

Tom moved to accept the budget, Ian seconded. Carried.

Michael next raised the issue of membership fees to discuss if revenues are meeting operating costs. Council reviewed a list of costs shared by all members. Website hosting is a moving target since it continues to vary and they don't accept cheques anymore. He then went through a few other line items of expenses for the society explaining what they are for/the value we get out of them. Some are getting more expensive (i.e., Canada Post). Michael also went over the costs associated with printing and distributing the journal, as well as projected revenues based on membership numbers.

#### **Discussion:**

Isabel noted that translation is a real bargain at \$50 per abstract as well as a printed copy of the journal. Totalling of costs suggests annual expenses for running the society is a bit over \$6,000 a year for journal, prizes, postage for mailing books to reviewers, and administration. The cost per member to print a journal is \$7.77 (all in with taxes) per issue. The challenge is the cost of paper keeps rising and will likely keep rising due to inflation. Postage is \$6.60 for Canadians and almost \$20 for Americans. Envelopes also cost a lot. All told, the costs per member receiving a paper copy of the journal are around \$80 but memberships are \$70, therefore a loss. There is a slight gain for institutional members. Electronic membership is less expensive but the society's costs still exceed the fee. Michael concluded that overall we are losing money (notes that previous surpluses were the result of delays in journal publication). However, since our bank balance at \$30,000 is strong, this is not the time to go to members and ask for a raise in membership fees. Instead, we should monitor the general financial situation and possibly re-visit the possibility of raising membership fees in 2023. Ian noted that the changes would take effect in 2024. Rich says this is an important document (cost per member) and it should be brought forth to the AGM and discussed. Richard mentioned that the conferences usually make a decent profit – should this also be factored into the budgeting? Michael agreed that this was a good point – conferences can make some money (notes that NASOH in particular makes a profit from conferences). Walter mentioned that if we bring the issue to the annual meeting expect former Council members to demand that the previous surplus be dipped into to offset a potential membership fee increase. Rich says he was one of the ones who had previously to dip into the surplus but this quickly got the society into financial trouble, which it was eventually able to get out of but we should avoid this kind of yo-yo again. Ian suggested

we should round up to have round numbers – i.e., instead of \$38.50, round up to \$40 – so as to avoid “false precision” – and offered to help with this. Isabel likes the idea of distributing the document in advance of the meeting because not everyone attends the AGM. This will make the membership more prepared to discuss. Faye suggested that to generate cash in the past, CNRS has offered a two-year membership at the previous cost. She also noted that NASOH charged \$250 for an in-person conference, which is very steep. Richard mentioned that other organizations have life memberships for a substantial sum – is this someone we want to consider? Michael commented that these are all excellent suggestions and that we should bring forward the cost per member information to the AGM. Sam noted that there is a pattern of membership renewals, but there is also a challenge of people not indicating that they are leaving the CNRS (Faye: this includes those members who have passed), and this complicates things for Sam, especially since many people often pay for multiple years. A deadline of 1 January was suggested, but the difficulty of enforcing this was also noted. Rich suggested that we should consider a pro-rated membership. Michael noted that membership is January to December, but that ideally, if one joins in July, they should receive all the benefits (including the journal) from that year. However, this becomes tricky in terms of journal supply. Dollar pro-rating would be very difficult – not practical. Walter notes that in August we will mail out last of 2021 issues to all members who are owed them.

10 min break – back at 12:15

### **Membership report**

Sam spoke about his report. He needs to be more active pruning members if they have not renewed in a while. Domestically, we are 25% digital memberships. He has to get back to NASOH’s membership secretary to update their list of joint members, which has grown from six to around 21 in recent years. In terms of institutions, he is finding it difficult to manage memberships because he has very little contact information. Only when institutions that have not received issues of the journal does he hear from them. With other institutions, we get their payments but the email addresses are defunct/need to be updated. When it comes to attracting student members, Sam and Amjorn put together a list of university programs offering maritime history, but people change jobs so frequently it is difficult to keep the lists up to date.

### **Discussion:**

Michael noted that from the NASOH annual meeting he attended in June, they recognized one of their challenges is the “greying” membership, which is very similar to the CNRS. It is increasingly difficult to find academics offering courses in nautical history subjects, and by extension, supervising graduate students. Amjorn asked if we should reach out to the Wilfrid Laurier University political science department because they are actively exploring International Relations again. Sam noted that we occasionally get students but it is difficult keeping them, especially after one year. Michael noted that maritime archaeology is a growth area for NASOH membership. Michael asked Meaghan if maritime history is on the rise at Memorial University of Newfoundland. Meaghan said no, it is mostly her, one other post-doctoral fellow, and the old Matthews/Panting shipping archive, but the only person using the records is Meaghan. Michael called for a university to establish an endowed university chair in Canadian maritime history in the hope it would lead to more individuals studying maritime history,

including graduate students. Sam would like to launch a formal sponsorship program to raise money for this initiative. Richard and Rich mentioned Pete Kikkert as an endowed chair, but also to be wary about commercial connections (could be choppy waters – i.e., Pete’s chair was endowed purely because the Canadian government insisted Irving Shipbuilding fund these positions as part of its contract).

### **Publications**

Roger reported that it is all good news. Rich and Roger have been heavily involved in soliciting and peer reviewing articles. Other conferences have been particularly useful for getting potential content. As we get caught up with printed issues (noting Walter’s great work at getting them mailed out), we have had great challenges with the editorial board membership. We have lost many of our contacts in the UK and losing touch with some NASOH members as they retire and don’t update their email addresses (though this was clarified this morning by NASOH). Roger warns that the editorial board members will need to change in the next issue or two. We also need to succession plan Faye’s replacement as book review editor. Faye has agreed to be patient as we do this.

### **Discussion:**

Michael noted that to reduce Walter’s labour producing the journal, he is exploring other companies to print and distribute the journal. Sam raised the issue of institutional members that are missing issues from recent volumes. Walter indicates that he has back issues to 2015 and Paul has earlier issues. Faye suggested that we should just refer them to digital versions of the journal, where they can print it for free. There was also a good discussion about members who have passed if their estate would be willing to donate their copies of the journal to CNRS and/or including the CNRS in their estate for possible donations. Michael asked Sam to do another run through the membership list to trim more non-active members to see if we can get some extra issues. Sam estimates this will result in only two or three copies.

### **Conferences**

Michael discussed this year’s upcoming conference. We all need to register and encourage others to sign up. Richard will soon put out the call for the AGM. Meaghan will chair the program committee for the 2023 in-person conference in St. John’s. Michael also discussed the 2024 conference in St. Catharines. It will be a joint conference with NASOH. NASOH has a standing venue committee and an ad hoc program committee. We will need to coordinate with both, especially the former. Isabel asked if there will be a virtual portion. Michael mentioned that one of the advantages of the virtual aspect was accessibility of people from around the world. Warren Reiss of NASOH’s venue committee supports the idea of a virtual component at a joint CNRS-NASOH conference.

### **Awards**

Tom discussed his report. The good news is that the Matthews Award has been decided and will be announced at the conference. The committee will now choose the best article and the student article. The bad news is that there have been no submissions for the Cartier Award (though we have had inquiries about sending in an MA thesis for next year) and we are not awarding the Panting award because of the virtual conference. Tom apologizes for not canvassing for these awards (especially

Cartier). He also asked Council what they think is the best way to go about doing this to get the word out as best as possible and solicit submissions from history and political science departments in particular.

#### **Discussion:**

Roger observed that under Tom's regime, we now have an appreciative brief on each of the books up for the Matthews Award. This has allowed smaller publishers to send in good book candidates. Margaret thinks promoting the new terms of reference on twitter will help with nominations for the Cartier award.

#### **Nominating Committee**

Rich discussed his report/list of councillors, including his accompanying email where he proposed filling the one vacant councillor position with Sebastian Harper. Rich noted that the list of Council members has not been updated on the CNRS website and has asked Paul to do this, but that the list is accurate in both *TNM* and *Argonauta*.

#### **Discussion:**

Isabel indicated that she likes Sebastian's resume. Council is really an eye opener for CNRS members who join in that they tend to learn more about CNRS. Should we therefore consider expanding the councillor number to as many as 12 for succession planning? Isabel asked if Roger or someone else has a former student who is in an admin position who would be interested in Council, with the hope they might be inclined to take on more administrative Council positions. Michael, as a university administrator, agrees that such an individual could be useful but that someone would likely join Council not because they are an administrator but because of their interest in maritime history and the support of their employer (i.e., time spent). Michael believes that maritime museums offer potential for new members of Council. Isabel indicated she was happy with the idea of expanding Council. Michael will look at Corporations Canada guidelines on structure of councils. Richard asked if we should consider a designated councillor position for an early stage scholar. Michael indicated we have Sam, Meaghan, and Ambjorn who represent early career scholars, so we are doing well in this regard. We also need to enhance the diversity of Council.

#### **Other business**

Sam discussed the communications plan, noting that he is planning to put together a message calendar. He is in particular hoping to make it more in synch with the academic year to ensure the calls for certain awards, conferences, etc. get to people early so they have the time to submit something.

Michael thanked everyone who agreed to stay on Council this year. He finds the meetings interesting, entertaining and informative. In particular, he wanted to thank Kip for the great work he does on Argo.

Michael asked if we should have the conference recorded. Most presenters see the conference as a venue to talk about works in progress, where some ideas are not polished but we want to get feedback and therefore don't want it recorded. There are others who want a recording so it can go on the resume for people to see what they talked about. Margaret suggested a model where papers are recorded but only sent on

request.

Ian suggests we have a fall meeting to set the budget for next year. There was general consensus in favour of this.

No other business.

Meeting adjourned at 13:30.

Respectfully submitted, Richard Goette, Secretary

## Argonauta guidelines for prospective authors

*Argonauta* aims to publish articles of interest to the wider community of maritime research enthusiasts. We are open to considering articles of any length and style, including research articles that fall outside the boundaries of conventional academic publishing (in terms of length or subject-matter), memoirs, humour, reviews of exhibits, descriptions of new archival acquisitions, and outstanding student papers. We also publish debates and discussions about changes in maritime history and its future. We encourage submissions in French and assure our authors that all French submissions will be edited for style by a well-qualified Francophone. Articles accepted for publication should be easily understood by interested non-experts.

For those producing specialized, original academic work, we direct your attention to *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord*, a peer-reviewed journal appropriate for longer, in-depth analytical works also managed by the Canadian Nautical Research Society.

Except with proper names or in quotations, we follow standard Canadian spelling. Thus, the Canadian Department of Defence and the American Department of Defense may both be correct in context.

For ship names, only the first letter of the names of Royal Canadian Navy ships and submarines is capitalized, and the name appears in italics. For example:

Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Protecteur*

Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Preserver*

Class of ship/submarine: *Victoria*-class submarines (not VICTORIA Class submarines)

Former HMCS *Fraser* rather than *Ex-Fraser* Foreign ships and submarines:

USS *Enterprise* HMS *Victory* HMAS *Canberra* 3

Following current industry standard, ships are considered gender neutral.

Although *Argonauta* is not formally peer-reviewed, the editors carefully review and edit each and every article. Authors must be receptive to working with the editors on any revisions they deem necessary before publication; the editors reserve the right to make small formatting, stylistic, and grammatical changes as they see fit once articles are accepted for publication.

Articles should conform to the following structural guidelines:

All submissions should be in Word format, utilizing Arial 12 pt. Please use endnotes rather than footnotes. All endnotes should be numbered from 1 consecutively to the highest or last number, without any repeating of numbers. We strongly encourage the use of online links to relevant websites and the inclusion of bibliographies to assist the younger generation of

emerging scholars.

Each image must be accompanied by a caption describing it and crediting the source, and indicating where the original is held. Images will not be reproduced without this information. Authors are responsible to ensure that they have copyright permission for any images, artwork, or other protected materials they utilize. We ask that every author submit a written statement to that effect. Please indicate clearly where in the text each image should go.

All authors are also responsible to ensure that they are familiar with plagiarism and that they properly credit all sources they use. *Argonauta* recommends that authors consult Royal Military College's website on academic integrity and ethical standards at this link: <https://www.rmcc-cmrc.ca/en/registrars-office/academic-regulations#ai>

We encourage our authors to acknowledge all assistance provided to them, including thanking librarians, archivists, and colleagues if relevant sources, advice or help were provided. Editors are not responsible for monitoring these matters.

With each submission, please include a brief (5-7 sentence maximum) biography.



# The Canadian Nautical Research Society

PO Box 34029  
Ottawa, Ontario K2J 5B1 Canada  
<http://www.cnrs-scrn.org>

CNRS membership supports the multi-disciplinary study of maritime, marine and naval subjects in and about Canada. Members receive:

- **The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord**, a quarterly refereed open access journal dedicated to publishing research and writing about all aspects of maritime history of the northern hemisphere. It publishes book reviews, articles and research notes on merchant shipping, navies, maritime labour, marine archaeology, maritime societies, and the like.
- **Argonauta**, an online CNRS membership quarterly that publishes articles, opinions, and news and information about maritime history, fellow members, and the Society.
- An Annual General Meeting and Conference located in maritime-minded locations, where possible with our US colleagues in the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH).
- Affiliation with the International Commission of Maritime History (ICMH).

Membership is by calendar year and is an exceptional value at \$70 for individuals, \$25 for students, \$45 for Early Career R or \$95 for institutions. Please add \$10 for international postage and handling. Members of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH) may join the Canadian Nautical Research Society for the reduced rate of \$35 per year. Digital Membership does not include a printed copy of The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord. Individuals or groups interested in furthering the work of the CNRS may wish to take one of several other categories of patronage, each of which includes all the benefits of belonging to the Society. CNRS is a registered charity and all donations to the Society are automatically acknowledged with a tax receipt. Should you wish to renew on-line, go to: [www.cnrs-scrn.org](http://www.cnrs-scrn.org)

	Canadian	International	Digital Only	Patronage Levels
Individual	\$70	\$80	\$30	Benefactor \$250
Institutional	\$95	\$105		Corporate \$500
Early Career	\$45	\$55	\$25	Patron \$1000 or above
Student	\$25	\$35		
NASOH	\$35	\$35		

Please type in or print clearly and return with payment (all rates in Canadian \$).

**NB:** CNRS does not sell or exchange membership information with other organizations or commercial enterprises. The information provided on this form will only be used for sending you our publications or to correspond with you concerning your membership and the Society's business.

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Email: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Payment by Cheque  Money Order  Visa  Master Card

Credit Card Number \_\_\_\_\_ Expiry date \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_